The musings of a nosey layman on the late Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia-enigmatic leader of some and stern ruler over many others.
In ‘Idealist Meles’, the first section of this three-part series published last week, I maintained that the life and times of the late Meles Zenawi can be categorized into three distinct but not necessarily exclusive ‘phases’.
Accordingly, I identified these phases in descending order as: Idealist Meles-early sixties to late eighties, Mellow Meles-early nineties to May 2005 and Bitter Meles-from June 2005 to 2013.
‘Idealist Meles’ was a generalized treatment of the radical and idealistic
young rebel in the years before he came to national and international attention. It led up to June 1991 when Meles & Co achieved the seemingly impossible-routing Derg forces to assume complete control of the war-weary nation.
The swift cascade of battle victories was somewhat unexpected-even by the most gung-ho field commanders. It was also a stiff and urgent challenge (but still a very welcome one) for the political wing, which had to almost instantly transform from rebel leadership into a national administration.
The vastly changed circumstances also compelled Meles to adopt a more pragmatic, even conciliatory, political tone. Idealist Meles was now beginning to give way to Mellow Meles.
Meles would have been astute enough to realize that although his fighters had crushed the unpopular Derg’s war machine, the fundamental issues that the Derg forces had fought for were still critical concerns of a large majority of Ethiopians.
Foremost among these was the vexing question of Eritrea-a problem that has haunted the nation for close on forty years. Considering that the Mengistu Hailemariam dictatorship managed to last for seventeen bloody years (1974-1991), one may conclude that it did so with the support of the population.
The junta hijacked what had been a genuine revolution against the feudal empire of the late Emperor Haile Sellasie. It massacred the intelligentsia which had sparked the revolution, confiscated land holdings and urban residences, emasculated the economy and poured what meager resources the nation had left into what eventually became Africa’s largest armed forces.
As the war dragged on and on the junta’s insatiable demand for more and more soldiers led to forced conscription to the point where parents bemoaned the day they gave birth to male children. Yet, despite these and other deprivations, the populace at large did not resort to open rebellion. Why?
The reason was quite simple. It was believed by most Ethiopians that the junta was the only force which could prevent the disintegration of their ancient land. This and only this fact helped to keep a detested regime in power for so long. It was love of country which compelled the population to suffer such a reviled dictatorship.
Therefore, following the eventual secession of Eritrea in 1993 and the catastrophic loss of all access to our ports on the Red Sea, Meles & Co, launched a charm offensive in a bid to salvage support from an appalled nation which rightly considered the newly installed regime to be as bad if not worse than, the hated secessionists.
In fact, popular opinion went so far as to label Meles & Co the lackeys of the traitorous Eritreans.
In retrospect, the years between 1991 and 2005 can be described as having been the best years of Meles Zenawi’s political life. It was an historic period during which the ruling party had the confidence to allow for a relatively wide political space. Genuine freedom of speech made possible the emergence (almost from scratch) of a vibrant print media.
‘Mellow Meles’ had emerged wearing the cloak of democratic pluralism. For the first time ever, the venerable parliament building in Addis Ababa became an arena where genuine political diversity was allowed to roam the gilded halls.
The nation began to enjoy the fiercely contested debates as an increasingly vocal opposition gave as well as it received. Meles himself seemed to revel in the cut and thrust of socio-political debates, demonstrating his oratorical skills to an admiring public and to the private media he helped make possible.
This positive state of affairs contributed to the massive public support witnessed in response to the sudden war with the new nation of Eritrea which erupted in 1998. Ethiopians quickly forgave the regime’s former treasonable collusion with the Eritreans and rallied to the defense of the nation. And when the core ruling party factionalized soon after, public support for Meles Zenawi continued unabated.
Perhaps it was this apparent endorsement of his policies which in 2005, helped convince Meles to hold the nation’s first ever free and fair elections. No doubt he was banking on a perceived popularity as well as the weakness of a fractured, inexperienced and squabbling opposition.
However, it was a risky gamble which Meles & Co were to sorely regret as a surprisingly reinvigorated opposition swept the polls. The sense of shock among regime figureheads was palpable as was the euphoria which gripped the public.
Meles, stunned with the ignominious defeat, reverted to the instinctive self-preservation common to all African dictators. He inexplicably denied the defeat, decreed martial law and ordered his forces to squash any and all manifestations of dissent. Protest marches erupted in Addis Ababa and throughout the country.
At least 200 people were brutally massacred in the capital alone and over 40,000 were detained without charge. The fledgling private press was muzzled to angry silence and leaders of the victorious opposition, bizarrely convicted for treason, were sentenced to life terms in the regime’s notorious prisons.
The end result was a hardening of positions by all sides which remains to this day. In the context of the life and times of Meles Zenawi, June/July 2005 marks the beginning of the end of the brief but historic experiment in unfettered democracy. It was the curtain call on the era of Mellow Meles and the emergence of ‘Bitter Meles’.
Source: www.newbusinessethiopia.com
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